Roy Simons

Home

Introduction

ROY W. SIMONS OBE SOUTH WEALD ROAD BRENTWOOD ESSEX CM14 4QZ 0277-212270

18th October 1992

 

Sir Robert Telford

c/o GEC-Marconi Limited

Publicity Unit

The Laurels, Victoria Road

Chelmsford

CM1 1PQ

 

Marconi 1997

 

As you will know I have sent to the Publicity Unit, at Jim Aikman's request, a copy of the Marconi "Who's Who" for the years just before the internal restructuring, which was of course before any of the mergers. This document contains a comprehensive list of the people holding appointments throughout the Company at that time.

 

Also sent were the graphs included with Tom Straker's five year forecast of 1965, which indicated potential success for the then proposed Automation, Computer and Satellite Communications Divisions and predicted a severe decline for Radar.

I also have the staff lists of Radar Division in 1965 with the transfers from the old "commercial" sections and a complete list of all the MRSL staff at Chelmsford, Leicester and Gateshead for the late seventies.

 

In preparation for my reply to the questionnaire, I scanned my diaries since 1965 and have listed some of the more important events etc. This summary has also been used by John Sutherland in compiling his paper. A copy of this scan is attached [DFH NOTE: Not attached, but I may be able to put my hand on it later.] I have not copied the content on to your pro-formas. This listing suffers from the generous use of project titles which would need explanation for any publication.

 

I have a copy of John's submission and I have not duplicated much of his content.

 

Firstly some general comments on the period just before 1965 and the new contracts that were inherited with the mergers.

 

Baker's book is quite good for the period approaching 1965, but regarding the work upon which Radar Division was engaged, with the majority of the effort being provided at that time by Research Division, there are a number of notable contracts which do not get a mention. In the years just before 1965, the "1958 Plan" and LINESMAN were being implemented, with Passive Detection in the UK and the display and data handling contract of STRIL 60 (Fur Hat) in progress in Sweden. There, two large underground buildings were built and installed at this time. SCAT and APOLLO and GREEN GINGER were very active with much MOD priority attached to them.

 

1965

Although not part of Marconi at this time, Elliotts and AEI were winning contracts which were to become our responsibility in due course. Elliotts had won contracts in competition with Marconi, for the MOD and Eurocontrol on price, which we were subsequently to inherit and attempt to complete at their figures. They (Elliott) were also implementing a contract for Libya, with substantial Marconi content, which was aborted due to the break in progress payments by the customer. This caused a severe cash flow problem in the Airspace Control Division of Elliotts and the invention of the expression "worked up turnover" after we investigated their accounting system.

 

AEI were negotiating, and obtained, the Saudi Air Defence system, using the 40T2 radar (a PV development based on the Type 85 radar for the MOD). Marconi had a good sub-contract to supply the display system. We inherited our own sub contract back, as well as the responsibility for completing the 40T2.

 

AEI had received a contract to supply two experimental tracking radars, based on an existing, in-service design, for use for missile trials at ASWE and Aberporth. Within months this had been converted to a contract to supply two radars, to go to sea in HMS Bristol by 1970, for the Sea Dart missile system and to be followed by a constant production quantity, to be known as the Type 909, for all new and refitted destroyers and frigates. AEI had never done any Naval work before. There was never a production prototype, causing incredible problems for the Company and the Royal Navy and a loss of reputation for us lasting for over 10 years.

 

Research Division, in collaboration with Radar Division, received the PX430 (Sea Cat Successor) study which was in due course to become the Sea Wolf surveillance and tracking system.

 

Under the auspices of McKinsey, five year forecasts were produced for the Marconi Company. Those for the proposed Electronics Group showed that Radar business would diminish, but that satellite communications and data handling business would increase. Within a year, the Radar predictions were shown to be totally incorrect and a little later the others also.

 

Reorganisation of the Company into the newly created divisions caused the transfer of valuable staff, particularly those with display and data handling expertise away from Radar work, to Automation and Computer Divisions. These losses affecting the Radar Display contracts in particular. This shortage of display and data handling staff, affected this area of work performance for many years.

 

The Questionnaires

I have made some entries in the sheets supplied, but that information can be enlarged upon considerably by myself and details provided by the many people that were involved. Regrettable however rather too many have passed away, some before and others in very early retirement.

 

Please do not hesitate to contact me for further details if they are required, I inevitably have plenty of memories of the Company as it was and a selection of anecdotes which would amuse you.

 

With very best wishes

Yours sincerely

Roy Simons

 

The History of Radar Division 1965-1969

The Bill Baker history of the Marconi Company ends with the McKinsey restructuring of September 1965, the company being split into two major and one smaller groups of divisions. The five year forecasts of the time, prepared by the company, and which had been influential in the reorganisation, predicted a steady decline of the traditional divisions - Communications, Radar, Broadcast, and Aeronautical - and dramatic growth of the newly created "sunrise" divisions such as Space, Automation, Computer, Line Communications, Mechanical Products etc. In the event, the reverse happened, the four traditional divisions flourished and formed the basis of three of the new system companies set up in 1969, and the sunrise divisions withered and were either scrapped altogether or swept up in the 1969 re-structure.

 

Although the divisional managers were appointed at the time of the announcement of the new structure in 1965, the personnel had not been allocated, and the first few days of the new regime were marked by unseemly auctions for key technical and commercial staff, the outcome being strongly influenced by the five year forecasts which turned out to be so dramatically wrong.

 

Radar Division found itself with a strong management team, but poorly supported at middle and lower levels. The Division was committed to a very large order-book of Government business; groups of projects like "Linesman", the massive "Green Ginger" programme etc. but very little private venture (PV) business, and an ageing and uncompetitive product range. Little or none of the work being undertaken for the Government was, by the nature of Ministry of Defence (MOD) specifications, capable of PV exploitation.

 

The first concern was to conceive, as a matter of considerable urgency, a product range which could be developed and manufactured quickly to meet the overseas needs clearly perceived by those involved. The Divisional Manager, Technical Manager and Engineering Manager met continuously, almost day and night, for several days (including several interludes on three bar stools at the Running Mare) and within a fortnight of the division's re-formation, the S600 Series was essentially defined, and became undoubtedly the most successful PV range the Marconi Company has produced before or since.

 

The S600 series was to be ground mobile, air transportable and helicopter liftable. There were to be modular transmitters, antennas and data handling - surveillance radars in S-band and L-band and a height-finder in C-band. The performance placed heavy emphasis on anti-jamming capability, which was a feature of every element of the system. The over-riding criterion against which every part of the development was weighed was cost effectiveness and value for money.

 

Feasibility studies were put in hand at once and it looked promising; prototype work started quickly and full blown development proposals were prepared, indicating initial expenditure of some £250K, which was to be followed by further substantial spend as the programme grew. It is amusing in hindsight to recollect that the Central Management of the Marconi Company set up in the 1965 structure deferred approval of the proposals, but were reluctant to stop the work, and it is a matter of record that the proposals have not been signed to this day!

 

The work was fascinating and stimulating, and proceeded at a great pace with immense enthusiasm; the key participants felt that they had "got their head" for the first time. There were negotiations with EEV over tubes, work on cabin design, air conditioning, automotive engineering for the running gear, tests on helicopter lift, air transport and cross country running, all over and above the hectic pace of circuit design, antenna development and mechanical layout in the laboratories and design offices. All this must be viewed against heavy commitment to MOD business and a shortage of experienced staff because of the demands of the new sunrise divisions. Nevertheless the work pressed ahead, advance publicity was prepared, scale models built and, in a remarkably short time, first demonstrations of elements of the system were beginning to be ready. The first public announcement was on 3rd May 1967 at the Marconi overseas agents' conference, followed by a Press Day at the test site at Bushy Hill. The first appearance in print was a major article in "Interavia" in January 1968, detailing the system performance and configurations. A fully operational system was demonstrated at Farnborough 1968, and firm prices and deliveries were quoted.

 

The moral of this phase of Marconi's evolution is clear; a well-thought-out programme, controlled by a single team, with enthusiastic, united, decisive and knowledgeable management, and with externally set milestones such as Farnborough, can achieve a satisfactory outcome in less than half the time and cost of the old-style MOD programmes, and indeed than some of the earlier PV projects with a moving target and unclear objectives.

 

The Farnborough demonstration in September 1968 generated enormous world-wide interest, since there was nothing like the S600 series available anywhere else, and the Division was dealing with a very wide spectrum of enquiries. Its performance, simplicity and relatively low cost was proving very attractive. The first firm order came from Malaysia, and this was clinched by a visit to the Bushy Hill demonstration by the Chief of the Malaysian Air Force,  Air Commodore Sulaiman bin Sujak, on 26th March 1969. By now factory tooling was proceeding, production test specifications and facilities were going together, spares scaling was in hand, maintenance handbooks were written, the company's own field engineers and resident maintenance engineers were in training and MarconiCollege was ready for the first customers' personnel for training.

 

Over the next few years, orders flooded in from all over the world from some thirteen or fourteen countries - in the end, orders substantially in excess of £100 million were received for the S600 series itself for a total development expenditure of some £2.5M, with significant sales of support facilities and spin-off products to almost the same amount again. This spin-off included sales of other Marconi Radar products embodying transmitters and other equipment from S600, replacements and modernisation of existing installation again using S600 units, and the further evolution of the S600 technology.

 

The remarkable thing was that over the years, the S600 series evolved almost exactly as first planned, both technically and commercially. The lesson Radar Division did learn however was the limited ability of third world air forces and armies to operate and maintain the equipment to its full capability, even though the system and the hardware were relatively simple and easy by Western standards, and had good basic reliability. This was to some extent a disappointment in the early years. In spite of excellent training and documentation, and all that had been done in the way of planning, there were problems. Firstly, the customers ignored advice on the level of training, Marconi resident maintenance engineers (RMEs), spares and other support in spite of all efforts to persuade them that it was essential. The customers thought they were saving money, instead of making life difficult for themselves. The second problem, which was not foreseen, related to training at MarconiCollege; in general, the attendees were officers who regarded a trip to England as a "jolly". On their return, they were often promoted, or at best remained in their offices, leaving operation and maintenance of the equipment to untrained, unqualified and inexperienced lower ranks, with the result that the equipment was abused, misused and damaged. The Company was then accused of providing unreliable systems. Our only solution, which worked well in later years was to insist on the hiring of adequate numbers of RME's.

 

By 1969, when firstly the English Electric acquisition of Elliott had taken place, and then the GEC acquisition of AEI and English Electric had settled somewhat, the very strong order book, good profitability and modern product range of Marconi Radar Division put it in a good position to benefit in the restructuring of all GEC's electronic interests.

 

MARCONI RADAR - H.M.GOVERNMENT BUSINESS 1965-1982

During the period 1965 to 1982, between roughly half of Marconi Radar business was directly for the British Government in the form of Development, Production and Support contracts. Marconi supported two virtually discrete development teams during this period, one on Government (HMG) business and the other on Private Venture (PV). The tragedy of those decades was that HMG bought very little PV equipment, with the notable exception of MARTELLO in 1982, and little of the equipment developed for HMG was saleable in world markets - it was expensive, elaborate and in some cases nearing obsolescence in concept since the cycle of decision making, research and development,   and getting round to placing contracts was so protracted. Indeed, in the few cases such equipment was sold it proved too complicated for third world military staff to operate and maintain.

 

In the 1960s the principal activities for HMG were the LINESMAN project and a mobile system for the Army for use with their Thunderbird system, code named GREEN GINGER. LINESMAN was the designation for the main U.K. Air Defence Ground System. The principal radars were the Type 85 high power 10 centimetre wavelength radar produced by AEI, and the Type 84 high power 23 centimetre radar developed by Marconi. Another major Marconi contribution to LINESMAN was the Passive Detection System, which has received little or no publicity even to this day. This was a means of jammer detection and location by correlation techniques, integrated with the primary radar (Type 85), which could pin-point simultaneously large numbers of electronic jammers (which effectively blotted out the radar) in three dimensions as accurately as the radar itself. It was fully proven through extremely extensive field trials, and once installed provided effective silent cover against electronic counter measures for the whole of UK for many years, and yet was totally unpublicised. There is always diffidence about mentioning individuals, but this system was so unusual and so effective that people should be named. It was based on simple principles conceived and evaluated by Norman Bailey at RAE Farnborough and brilliantly put into practice by "Uncle" Miller and Ian Donaldson and their teams at Great Baddow. Norman Bailey sadly died before full fruition of the system.

Passive Detection was released by HMG for use in NATO, and might well have become part of the NATO Air Defence Ground Environment (NADGE), but had two disadvantages. One, it was unique and thus made competitive bidding almost impossible (apparently this transcends operational need in NATO!) and secondly, however hard the attempts to explain the system, the NATO and National staffs never quite understood how it worked, and therefore were obstinately, but quite wrongly, suspicious of its operational capability.

 

GREEN GINGER was a mobile radar convoy for the Royal Artillery, also later adopted in very small numbers by the Royal Air Force. It consisted of an antenna vehicle with back-to-back 10 centimetre and 23 centimetre reflectors, (embodying the same principle as the earlier Marconi NATO early warning radar, but with point feed rather than linear). There was also a combined transmitter vehicle and 5 centimetre wavelength "nodding" height finder. This system was also sold overseas, but unfortunately not very successfully, since the complexities built into the design at the request of the Ministry of Defence proved too much for the operational and maintenance skills of the purchaser's personnel, who had rejected strong recommendations to employ Marconi resident engineers, and who then covered their own incompetence with allegations of unreliability.

 

MARCONI RADAR - NATO BUSINESS FROM 1965

At the reformation of Radar Division in 1965 the so-called Early Warning project for NATO, in partnership with CSF of France was almost complete and final contractual details had to be tied up. An attempt by Britain and France to win the next round of air defence business through a Government backed consortium of Marconi, AEI, CFTH and IBM-France (AFCAD - Anglo-French Collaboration on Air Defence) was fading after two years of hard work because the USA realised that a major system was near to procurement without American commercial participation. They forced through the "Balance of Payments" (BOP) principle in which participation in large NATO procurements would benefit each NATO nation in precise proportion to its contribution to NATO "infrastructure" funds. Therefore NATO issued a detailed requirement and request for bids for the future NATO Air Defence Ground Environment (NADGE) in which funding would adhere to the BOP. Three international competitive consortia were formed to bid for NADGE. Marconi joined the consortium led by Hughes Aircraft Company, and including Thomson-CSF of France, Selenia of Italy, AEG-Telefunken of Germany and Hollands Signaal Apparaten of the Netherlands.

For the first round of bidding, the Marconi Passive Detection System (PD) was included by all three consortia since it was unique. Unfortunately all three bids were too high and PD was eliminated from the second bids. The Hughes consortium was successful in the second round and the contract was let in 1966. Hughes formed a joint venture project company called NADGECO, based in Feltham, Middlesex, to implement the programme. Since there was unprecedented and unforeseen inflation during the period of the contract, NADGECO claimed for an increase in the contract price, which was finally achieved after completion of the work. The Marconi content was the supply and installation of fourteen height finder radars, plus extensions, additions and improvements to the early warning stations, which involved a number of problems, but also included the responsibility for simulation and IFF contracts with Elliott, inherited at the English Electric acquisition of Elliott, and regrettably in deep trouble.

 

In 1982 Marconi Radar received a NATO contract for the supply of MARTELLO radars.

 

Marconi had participated in virtually every major NATO air defence project from the 1950's to the 1980's.

 

MARCONI RADAR - MARTELLO

The S600 series had been a great commercial and technical success ,but had only targeted a somewhat limited market for mobile systems; it was also expected to reach obsolescence by the late 70's. The requirement for larger and more expensive static systems for major nations was being satisfied in the U.K. by LINESMAN, in NATO by NADGE, in Saudi Arabia by SAGEU (in all of which Marconi Radar was a major player) and in the US by their own indigenous products which it was almost impossible to dislodge. However, a need was perceived for the performance of the big static radars in mobile configuration; at the same time electronic warfare was increasingly significant, and resistance to jamming ("electronic counter measures" - ECM) was also vital. Marconi Radar therefore took the decision to make a massive investment in a new range of three-dimensional air defence radars with the family name of MARTELLO.

 

Throughout the 50's, 60's and 70's, ECM performance had been a key factor in Marconi's radar engineering philosophy - in particular the critical design of antennas to control beam shape, and the effective use of frequency. Thus the technologies were in place for the next "leap forward". Whilst it was desirable to make the maximum use of solid state, at the outset the necessary components were still under-developed and the first versions of MARTELLO were based on a high powered 23 centimetre source with beam shaping in the vertical plane by power splitting, combined with accurately shaped multiple receiver beams.

 

Many of the development problems had therefore been tackled by the time reliable solid state devices became available, which were incorporated in a fully distributed all solid state 10 centimetre wavelength air defence radar in the MARTELLO range. Fortunately there was nothing comparable available on the market and a good order book was built up over the 80's.

 

MARTELLO was first demonstrated publicly at Farnborough in September 1978 and attracted enormous attention from the international Press and the world's Air Forces. The first major order was for three systems for the British Ministry of Defence, linked to four systems for NATO; the first system was handed over to MOD shortly after contract, at the beginning of April 1982. Marconi Radar achieved a Queen's Award to Industry for Technology for the MARTELLO radar.

 

MARCONI RADAR - NAVAL ACTIVITY

In the mid sixties, work was well advanced on a feasibility study designated PX430 for the definition of a replacement for the SEACAT close range naval air defence missile system. This was to lead to a full development programme of the SEAWOLF system in 1968 and 1969. Unfortunately the restructuring of the Marconi Company in 1965 drained staff out of Radar Division who were vital to this and other projects into new (and subsequently shown to be sterile) divisions such as space, automation, computer, mechanical products and others.

 

The system was based on complicated ship-borne equipment and a simple missile, which was an economical solution. It made an inauspicious start however. Although Marconi had system responsibility for all shipboard elements BAC, who made the missile, were under contract to a different Ministry and the two rarely spoke. Furthermore, a Ferranti computer was imposed on the design. BAC began their programme well before Marconi and obviously became impatient. Marconi was breaking new ground in tracking techniques and ran into delays in software implementation. Nevertheless the trials firings in HMS Penelope were technically excellent, and the system repeatedly intercepted 4.5 inch shells fired from another ship. A massive production programme followed through the 70's.

 

At Leicester at the time of the acquisition of AEI, work was proceeding on the SEADART tracking radar type 909. Unfortunately the AEI teams, whilst experienced in ground systems were lacking in recent naval experience and were having a difficult time. Furthermore, the contract did not permit the company to retain prototypes for engineering or production, which proved to be a very false economy. The combination of these two factors was a system which met specifications when operational but suffered reliability problems, and acquired an enduring adverse reputation over a long period - much of it definitely unwarranted in later years. Four 909 radars were supplied to the Argentine Navy in the two Type 42 ships sold by Vickers.

 

Leicester were later engaged in the development of a Surveillance and Target Indication Radar (STIR). The original programme was then cut back to a simpler system type 1022. There was also a project to update the 965 metric surveillance radar, and manufacturing contracts to refurbish the 901 SEASLUG radars.

 

The control engineering team at Leicester were concerned with a range of projects for the Royal Navy; this included control of the 4.5 Mk VIII guns, many directors, launchers and turning gears, also degaussing and cathodic protection.

 

The Leicester team successfully designed a private venture range of lightweight tracker radars for naval use and they were sold overseas; the Egyptian Navy procured six fast patrol boats from Vosper Thornycroft equipped with these trackers.

 

In 1980 and 1981 as a result of defence cutbacks and the MOD major defence review, the majority of the Leicester development work on Type 909 improvements and derivatives of STIR was summarily cancelled, representing a very high proportion of the total engineering and design load . Substantial claims were successfully pursued against MOD for legitimate cancellation charges, and the projects could have been completed at almost the same overall cost; in the event, in spite of efforts at redeployment six hundred development staff were made redundant - a tragic waste of money and talent.

 

PROJECTS IN SAUDI ARABIA

1. "SAGEU"

The Saudi Arabian Ground Environment project (SAGEU) was part of the outstanding order book and work in progress inherited by MRSL from AEI Leicester in 1969. Due to difficulties in the early stages the contract had substantial built-in losses, quite apart from costs in excess of estimates. The scheme consisted of five major radar sites, each equipped with AEI type 40T2 radars and display and command and control facilities provided by Marconi Radar, an Air Defence Control Centre equipped by Marconi Radar, and a substantial network of tropospheric scatter stations linking all the sites, provided by Marconi Communications.

 

SAGEU was part of a larger Defence scheme provided by a consortium of British Aircraft Corporation, Airwork and AEI. It covered the supply of Lightning and Strikemaster aircraft, a massive training programme, all maintenance and support, and of course, SAGEU. After two and a half years of negotiation, Letters of Intent (ITP) valid for six months were issued to each of the consortium partners in December 1965. Draft contracts were submitted to the Saudi Arabians early in 1966, and BAC and Airwork signed their contracts in May. The other two partners were inhibited in implementation until AEI signed and there was considerable moral pressure on AEI. The AEI problem revolved around price; they had accepted an ITP with a somewhat ill-defined statement of work to be done, and with a price label of £18.65, knowing that this was many millions too low, but assuming the price could be negotiated to a much higher level when the main contract was signed. (The irony of this situation was that the two major Marconi sub-contracts were included at full commercial price). Discussions on price continued throughout 1966, and consortium pressure on AEI intensified. The price finally submitted personally in Saudi Arabia by the highest executive level of the parent AEI company was £25.7M which had been calculated as the absolute minimum acceptable level. In one afternoon of "negotiation" with Prince Sultan in November 1966, the Chief Executive of the main AEI Board reduced the price to £22M in order to achieve signature, building in a loss of £3.7M from the outset. The contract as finally signed is dated 26th April 1967.

 

When MRSL "inherited" the SAGEU contract in August 1969, quite apart from the built-in loss, it was in problems with time scale, costs were rising above estimates and there were a number of irritating difficulties with the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). Clearly rapid action was necessary; GEC seconded an experienced project manager to MRSL to help with the running of the programme, re-estimates of time and costs were made and the whole project was tightened up. In spite of some failures by AEI in the implementation of SAGEU, there were a number of identifiable shortcomings in the performance of the contractual liabilities of the RSAF which could be shown to be inhibiting the progress of the project. These were carefully elaborated in the form of a claim for further funding and a restatement of time scales. In July 1972, after a seemingly endless series of meetings with "committees", there was an ultimate meeting with Prince Sultan. After tough argument and negotiation, he finally settled on an extra payment of £3.6M. This also improved relations with the RSAF, and the project went ahead to plan. Also the pressure was off the Radar part of the overall programme because of maintenance, reliability and support problems elsewhere. Handover was progressively achieved quite smoothly and invoices were paid promptly.

 

2. S600 SERIES CONVOY

The Saudi Ministry of Defence ordered a 600 series convoy. For some political reason, the RSAF were reluctant to take it over, and Marconi RME's had to maintain it under appalling conditions for many months before acceptance. Even then it was not welcome, and the RSAF handed the system over to the Kingdom of Jordan

 

3. SIMCATS

MRSL entered a partnership with Lockheed and ITT to update the SAGEU system and make it suitable for Civil Air Traffic Control. This involved MRSL in modifications to the 40T2 radars, plus the supply of S654 ATC radars and Secondary radar facilities. ITT supplied substantial additional communications, and Lockheed supplied the buildings and infrastructure and acted as prime contractor. MRSL signed a sub-contract with Lockheed in July 1976 for well in excess of 100 million dollars - its biggest contract so far. There were certain delays in implementation; although some equipment was late, the building programme was in default, and MRSL successfully claimed significant extra funding from Lockheed.

 

VISITORS

Marconi Radar Division and Marconi Radar Systems Limited always cultivated the policy of promoting visits to the various Company Radar establishments by public figures and representatives of the customer both home and overseas. Furthermore, as a part of the recognition of the importance of training, annual prize-giving ceremonies were arranged at the main establishments for apprentices and trainees. They were occasions for parents to see the company and meet the executives in a social environment. On each occasion a distinguished visitor from a very wide range of activities was invited to give the prizes.

 

In the general run of visits, ministers, senior civil servants, senior serving officers of the three Services - British, Foreign, NATO etc were regularly received, as were senior personnel of Companies with whom Marconi was associated in joint projects, the Press, civic dignitaries, foreign trade delegations etc. Some of these visits were for specific activities - to negotiate contracts, to review progress, attend formal meetings and so on, but it was also felt to be important to create and sustain as wide a public awareness as possible of the company's capability and achievement.

 

The most prominent occasion was a half-day visit by HRH Prince Charles, Prince of Wales, as part of his programme of familiarisation with industry. The Marchese Marconi and Principessa Elettra visited during the centenary celebrations of the birth of Marconi, and on another occasion his schoolboy grandson Michael Marconi Braga toured the Company.

 

NOTE Many of these visits are well documented in Press clippings and official photographs, and  extensive scrapbooks exist.

 

Roy Simons

Home